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Abstract
We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities
and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium.
When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects
an investment boom, investments should be taxed. Conversely, any positive invest-
ment tax is suboptimally high if the public information is sufficiently unfavorable.
We also show that an investment tax may increase overall investment activity.
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1 Introduction
We consider a two-player model with social learning. There is a state of the world drawn
from a normal distribution. Both players get a normally distributed private signal about
the realization of the state. They then simultaneously decide whether or not to act in
period one. If a player acts, her payoff equals the state of the world. A player who has
not acted in period one, observes the other player’s period-one decision and then gets to
reconsider her own choice in period two. Payoffs from acting late are discounted, and a
player who doesn’t act receives her outside option.
For an application, consider two firms—say regional monopolists—that produce out-
put using a similar production technology but have distinct customer groups. Suppose
a new technology of uncertain quality becomes available and both firms are considering
whether or not to adopt it. Each firm investigates this novel technology and updates its
belief about its profitability. In such a setting each firm can postpone her investment
decision in order to learn from the other firm’s decision: firms may engage in social
learning. Our model investigates how this social learning affects investment behavior
and optimal tax policy.
We also believe the second question to be of broader interest. A heavily debated
question is whether investments should be discouraged when policymakers suspect too
many people to invest. While focusing on a relatively simple two-player game, our
model emphasizes a novel reason for why policymakers should tax investments in the
presence of favorable public information even if all investors are better informed than
the policymaker herself and are completely rational. Doing so improves the ability of
investors to learn from each others’ behaviors.
Throughout we focus on switching strategies in which a player invests in period one
whenever she is sufficiently optimistic and not otherwise. The value of waiting in social
learning environments depends on the behavior of others. In our game, whenever the
other player’s cutoff is sufficiently low, seeing him investing comes as no surprise. As
an investment decision then contains little information, this makes waiting relatively
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undesirable. As the cutoff becomes higher, he will invest less often. An investment deci-
sion then reveals good private information which, in turn, makes waiting more desirable.
Whenever this force is strong enough, multiple symmetric switching equilibria exist. Sec-
tion 3 thus characterizes when there exists a unique symmetric switching equilibrium.
In particular, if the variance of the prior distribution is high enough or the one of the
private signal is low enough, equilibrium is unique. Similarly, if players are impatient
enough or the prior mean is either sufficiently high or low, equilibrium is unique. Build-
ing on this characterization, Section 4 investigates the optimal investment tax/subsidy.
Whenever the prior mean is sufficiently high, it is optimal to tax investments. Roughly
speaking, if the prior mean is high, both firms are very likely to invest in the first period,
which implies that the informational content of an investment decision is low. A tax, by
making players less likely to invest in the first period, raises the informational content of
the investment decision and thereby increases the positive information externality asso-
ciated with any time-one investment. Conversely, any positive tax is suboptimally high
if the prior mean is sufficiently low.
Section 5 elaborates on how an investment tax affects investment activity. Obviously,
a tax reduces the payoff from investing. Ceteris paribus, this direct effect makes investing
less attractive and thus tends to increase both the first- and the second-period equilib-
rium cutoffs. An increase in the investment tax, however, also raises the informational
content of an investment: if —despite an investment tax—a player invests, this signals
that her posterior is “very high” and not simply “high”. This indirect effect decreases
the second-period cutoff. Whenever this indirect effect dominates, there exist posterior
realizations such that the overall investment activity is higher with a positive investment
tax. Finally, in Section 6 we show that asymmetric equilibria in switching strategies can
be ruled out in the presence of favorable public information. We also illustrate that the
symmetric switching equilibrium is unique for any finite number of players when they
have a Laplacian prior.
Social learning has been intensively studied in herding models in which the timing of
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players’ decisions is exogenous.1 Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) introduced a waiting
game in which there are informational externalities and players decide on both whether
and when to act. Although there are numerous papers considering different waiting
games,2 to the best of our knowledge only Gossner and Melissas (2006) and Levin and
Peck (2008) study optimal taxation in such a game. Furthermore, no paper in the
literature on social learning has systematically analyzed the relationship between prior
public information and optimal taxation.
Most closely related to our model is the waiting game studied by Chamley (2004a) who
nicely highlights and explains the possibility of multiple symmetric switching equilibria.
In contrast to our paper, Chamley does not derive conditions under which the symmetric
switching equilibrium is unique and, most importantly, does not investigate the optimal
tax policy. Also, since we are interested in investigating the relationship between a
policymaker’s prior information and the optimal tax policy, we differ from Chamley by
making the for our question more natural assumption that the state of the world is
normally rather than binary distributed.
The main difference between our setup and the one in Levin and Peck (2008) is that
they assume idiosyncratic investment costs. They show that following some histories
observing more past investment activity can lead to a downward revision of players’
posteriors. In large economies, it is optimal to either subsidize investment or not to
interfere in the market. In a two-player economy, however, a small investment subsidy
can lower welfare. Intuitively, a small subsidy can encourage some types with bad private
information but low investment costs to invest, which can reduce the informational value
of observing overall investment activity.3
1For an excellent overview, see Chamley (2004b).
2Waiting games have, among others, also been analyzed by Chamley and Gale (1994), Gul and
Lundholm (1995), Zhang (1995), Choi (Section 4, 1997), Caplin and Leahy (1998), Frisell (2003), and
Gunay (2008).
3In contrast to our paper, Levin and Peck do not provide conditions that guarantee uniqueness within
the class of the symmetric switching strategies. In a simpler setup, Gossner and Melissas also showed
that a small investment tax can—depending on the selected equilibrium—raise welfare.
In Angeletos and Pavan (2009) players receive a public and a private signal about the
realization of some payoff-relevant variable.4 Among other things, they argue that in
the presence of positive payoff externalities, investment decisions may be too responsive
to a player’s private information (which increases the risk of miscoordination).5 Since
an investment subsidy that is increasing in the aggregate investment activity induces
players to base their investment decisions more on the public instead of their private
information, it is optimal to introduce such a subsidy scheme in their setup.
2 The Model
Two risk-neutral players have the possibility to invest in a risky project. Players can
invest in two periods. If Player i invests at time one, she gets a monetary payoff of Θ−τ .
Henceforth, we refer to Θ ∈ R as the state of the world and τ ∈ R as an investment tax
(τ > 0) or subsidy (τ < 0). If player i invests at time two, she gets δ(Θ − τ), where
δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the common discount factor. Investments are irreversible. The state
of the world Θ is randomly drawn from a normal distribution with mean Θ¯ and variance
σ2Θ. Player i receives a normally distributed private signal si concerning Θ’s realization.
More precisely, we assume that si = Θ + ǫi, where ǫi is independently drawn from a
normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2ǫ .
The timing is as follows: At time zero, the government sets the investment tax τ .
Thereafter, our waiting game starts with nature drawing the state of the world and
all signals. After observing the investment tax τ and their private signals, players at
4Closely related is also Dasgupta (2007). He considers a two-period irreversible investment model
with a continuum of players, exogenous observation noise, and positive network externalities. Dasgupta’s
paper focuses on how the ability to wait influences the extent of coordination failures in environments
with positive network externalities and private information. He is not interested in the relationship
between prior public information and optimal tax policy.
5This result contrasts nicely with Vives (1997) who showed that absent payoff externalities investment
levels are not responsive enough to a player’s private information since players do not internalize their
information externalities.
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period 1 simultaneously decide whether to invest or wait. At the beginning of period 2,
players observe past investment choices. Any player who has not invested in period 1
then decides whether or not to invest in period 2. Finally, players receive their payoffs
and the game ends.
We refer to the expected state of the world conditional on a player’s signal as the
player’s time-one posterior mean, i.e. µi ≡ E(Θ|si), and it is often useful to use time-
one posterior means to describe equilibrium behavior. Throughout we mainly—though
not exclusively—focus on equilibria in symmetric switching strategies. Player i is said
to follow a switching strategy if she invests at time one whenever her time-one posterior
mean exceeds a critical threshold value µc and refrains from investing otherwise. A
pair of strategies is a symmetric switching equilibrium if, given that Player j follows
a switching strategy with critical threshold µ∗, one has: (E1) it is strictly optimal for
Player i to invest in period one if and only if µi > µ
∗ ; and (E2) if Player i did not invest
at time one, she does so at time two if and only if her expectation of Θ given µi and
given the observed time-one decision of j exceeds τ . Below equilibrium more generally
refers to Bayesian equilibrium.6
3 Existence and Uniqueness of Switching Equilibria
In this section, we analyze the waiting game for a given investment tax τ and derive
necessary and sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a symmetric switching
equilibrium.
We first characterize properties of the best response to a switching strategy. To do
so, it is useful to consider the expected payoff difference between investing early and
delaying the investment decision. Let ∆(µi, µ
c
j) denote the difference between the gain
of investing in period 1 and the gain of waiting as a function of Player i’s posterior mean
6In our model players with sufficiently high (low) signals strictly prefer to invest (wait) at time one,
independent of the other player’s strategy. Hence, there are no off-the-equilibrium-path observations and
players can always apply Bayes’s rule so that any Bayesian equilibrium is consistent and sequentially
rational.
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µi under the assumption that Player j follows a switching strategy characterized by µ
c
j .
Thus,
∆(µi, µ
c
j) = µi − τ − δ Pr(µj > µ
c
j |µi) max{0, E(Θ|µi, µj > µ
c
j)− τ}(1)
− δ Pr(µj < µ
c
j |µi) max{0, E(Θ|µi, µj < µ
c
j)− τ}.
If ∆ > 0 Player i prefers to invest, while if ∆ < 0 she prefers to wait. We first observe that
a player who is more optimistic regarding the state of the world has a bigger incentive
to invest early. Formally,
Lemma 1. A player’s incentive to invest early increases in her time-one posterior mean,
i.e.
∂∆(µi, µ
c
j)
∂µi
> 0,∀µcj .
Lemma 1 states a common property of waiting games studied in the literature.7
Intuitively, the higher i’s time-one posterior mean, the higher the probability that it will
be optimal for her to invest at time two. Due to discounting, this makes waiting less
attractive.
Lemma 1 implies that there exists a unique time-one posterior mean at which Player
i is indifferent between investing and waiting given that Player j follows a switching
strategy characterized by µcj . Formally, i’s cutoff µ
I
i (µ
c
j) is implicitly defined through the
equation ∆(µIi , µ
c
j) = 0.
8
Suppose µi > τ and that i expects j to always wait so that µ
c
j = ∞. Then, of course,
j’s waiting decision bears no informational content. Thus the difference between the gain
of investing early and the gain of waiting and investing late is ∆(µi,∞) = (1−δ)(µi−τ) >
0. On the other hand, if µi < τ and Player i expects Player j to always wait, Player
i prefers not to invest. Hence, in this case i invests in the first period whenever her
time-one posterior mean is greater than the tax rate τ and refrains otherwise. Using a
similar reasoning, if Player i expects j to always invest, j’s investment decision has no
7See for example Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) and Chamley (2004b, Lemma 6.1, p. 124).
8The superscript “I” stands for “indifferent”.
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informational content and thus µIi (−∞) = µ
I
i (∞) = τ . Furthermore, mere inspection of
Equation 1 reveals that i’s best response cutoff µIi is continuous in µ
c
j . Lemma 1 thus
implies that the cutoff µ∗ characterizes a symmetric switching equilibrium if and only
if µIi (µ
∗) = µ∗, or equivalently, ∆(µ∗, µ∗) = 0.9 Graphically, µ∗ is the point at which
µIi (µ
c
j) crosses the 45-degree line (see Figure 5). Since µ
I
i (−∞) = µ
I
i (∞) = τ , and since
µIi is continuous in µ
c
j , a symmetric switching equilibrium exists.
We now investigate which conditions guarantee uniqueness. First, observe that a
player who is indifferent between investing and waiting must face a positive gain of
investing. This implies that µ∗ − τ > 0. Because µ∗ < E(Θ|µi = µ
∗, µj > µ
∗) a player
with time-one posterior µ∗ invests at time two after observing her fellow player investing.
We next argue that if µi = µ
∗, Player i does not invests in period two after observing
that Player j waited, i.e. E(Θ|µi = µ
∗, µj < µ
∗) < τ . Given that j follows a switching
strategy, observing him investing rather than waiting must make i more optimistic.10
Hence, if i wants to invest after having observed that j waited, she must also want to
invest after having observed that j invested. In such a case, she invests independent of
j’s time-one action. Her expected gain of waiting therefore is δ(µ∗− τ). However, she is
then better off investing at time one and receiving an expected payoff of µ∗ − τ .
Given this observation, we say that Player i receives “good news” when she observes
j investing. Using that a cutoff type invests in period two only when receiving good
news, ∆(µ∗, µ∗) simplifies to
(2) ∆(µ∗, µ∗) = µ∗ − τ − δPr(µj > µ
∗|µi = µ
∗)
[
E(Θ|µ∗, µj > µ
∗)− τ
]
= 0.
Our analysis below makes use of some intuitive and well-known properties of the
normal distribution (see the Appendix for proofs). First, Player i’s first-period posterior
mean µi is a weighted average between her private signal si and the prior mean Θ¯. The
more precise the prior information—i.e. the lower σ2Θ—the more weight Player i puts on
9It follows from Lemma 1 that E1 is satisfied when ∆(µ∗, µ∗) = 0. E2 is satisfied as well as equation
1 prescribes Player i to make an optimal time-two choice.
10Formally, E(Θ|µ∗, µj > µ
∗) > E(Θ|µ∗, µj < µ
∗).
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the prior mean and the less weight she puts on her signal. Conversely, the more precise
her private information—i.e. the lower σ2ǫ—the more she trusts her signal as opposed to
the prior mean. In particular, this implies that if the variance of the prior is infinite, or
if the variance of her signal is zero, her posterior mean is equal to her signal.
Second, Player i’s expectation of Player j’s posterior mean µj is a weighted average
of her own posterior mean µi and the prior mean Θ¯. Intuitively, Player i believes that
j’s signal is distributed around her best guess of the true state of the world—i.e. her
posterior mean. Player i, however, also realizes that Player j’s posterior mean is a
weighted average between j’s signal and the prior mean, and therefore is likely to lie
between i’s posterior and the prior mean. Based on this, a key fact we use below is that
if Player i’s posterior mean increases by one unit, her expectation about j’s posterior
mean increases by less than one unit. Hence, for example, the further her posterior
mean lies above the prior mean, the more likely i thinks that j is more pessimistic than
herself. Closely related, if the signal is (nearly) perfect—i.e. the variance of the signal
is (close to) zero—both players possess (almost) the same posterior. In that case Player
i believes that she always (almost) lies in the “center of the world”—i.e. independent of
her posterior there is a 50% chance of j being more optimistic than herself. A similar
argument also applies with a completely uninformative prior—i.e. when the variance of
the prior is infinite. In this case j puts zero weight on the prior mean when computing
his posterior. As i believes j’s signal to be distributed around her posterior mean, she
also always believes to lie in the center of the world.
Third, conditional on having the cutoff posterior mean µ∗, the probability that j’s
posterior is greater than the cutoff is
(3) Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi = µ
∗) = 1− F
(
κ1
(
µ∗ − Θ¯
))
,
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal and where
κ1 is a positive constant depending on the prior and signal variances. It follows from our
second observation as well as the formula above that an increase in µ∗ − Θ¯ reduces the
probability of j being more optimistic than the cutoff type i.
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Fourth, we are interested in the cutoff type’s expectation about the state of the world
when waiting and receiving good news. In a symmetric switching equilibrium, Player
i’s expectation will be based on her own signal, the prior mean, and the fact that j
invested and thus had a first-period posterior mean above the common cutoff µ∗. Here
our distributional assumptions allow us to use known properties of the truncated normal
distribution. Formally, in the Appendix we establish that
(4) E(Θ|µi = µ
∗, µj > µ
∗) = µ∗ + κ2h
(
κ1
(
µ∗ − Θ¯
))
,
where κ2 is a positive constant which (just as κ1) depends on σ
2
Θ and σ
2
ǫ , and where h
represents the hazard rate of the standard normal distribution. Intuitively, Player i’s
second-period expectation is the first-period expectation about the state of the world
plus an upward shift that depends on the cutoff, the prior mean, as well as—through
the constants—the variance of signals and the prior. We have seen above that the
cutoff type’s probability of getting good news decreases in the cutoff µ∗. The above
formula reveals that the impact of good news is also higher for higher cutoffs. Formally,
this follows from the fact that the hazard rate of the standard normal distribution is
increasing and thus, the upward shift is greater. The statistical intuition is as follows:
Player i’s belief of Player j’s first-period posterior mean is normally distributed with—
as we observed above—a mean that lies between i’ posterior mean and the prior mean.
As the cutoff increases, the expectation of Player j’s posterior mean increases by less
than the cutoff. Thus, if j invests he reveals that he lies in a higher quantile of this
distribution. Since the expectation of a left-truncated normally distributed variable is
increasing in the truncation point, the higher the cutoff the better the news for the
cutoff type when observing j investing. Consider now the case in which the variance of
the prior goes to infinity. As explained above, Player i then believes that she is in the
“center of the world”, i.e. there is, independent of her posterior, a 50 percent chance that
j possesses a higher posterior than herself. This implies that the upward shift does not
depend on the cutoff µ∗. Mathematically, in the Appendix we show that κ1 tends to zero
as the variance of the prior goes to infinity, while κ2 converges to a positive constant.
Thus in this special case the upward shift is independent of where the cutoff lies.
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Using Equations 3 and 4, we rewrite the equilibrium condition 2 as
µ∗ − τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain of investing
= δ
[
1− F
(
κ1(µ
∗ − Θ¯)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob of good news

µ∗ − τ + κ2h(κ1(µ∗ − Θ¯))︸ ︷︷ ︸
upward shift in beliefs


︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted gain of waiting
.
As µ∗ increases, there are two countervailing forces affecting the gain of waiting. On
the one hand, the probability of getting good news decreases. On the other hand, as
µ∗ increases receiving good news leads to a greater upward shift in beliefs. Indeed the
expected upwards shift [1 − F (·)]κ2h(·) = κ2f(·) and therefore is non-monotone and
unimodal.11 Rearranging by moving the linear terms in µ∗ to the left-hand side and
rewriting, yields
(5) µ∗ − τ = κ2X
(
κ1
(
µ∗ − Θ¯
))
, where X (·) ≡
δf(·)
1− δ(1− F (·))
.
The left-hand side is linear in µ. The right-hand side is positive and goes to zero as µ goes
to plus or minus infinity. Furthermore, Lemma 5 in the Appendix formally establishes
many properties of our X -function that are intuitive given that its numerator is the p.d.f.
of a normally distributed random variable. In particular, we prove that X is unimodal,
convex and increasing up to a critical value µ′ and thereafter concave and increasing up
to its mode µˆ. It is also easy to see that a unit increase in Θ¯ leads to a translation to
the right of X by one unit. This property is easiest to check when Θ¯ increases from zero
to one. In that case X (κ1(0− 0)) = X (κ1(1− 1)) as illustrated in Figure 1.
As Figure 2 illustrates, whenever the slope of κ2X is greater than one, multiple
equilibria can arise. Intuitively, a low posterior cutoff can be self-fulfilling since if µ∗ is
“low” an agent’s expected upward shift can be low, which makes waiting unattractive
and thus a low posterior cutoff desirable. If agents, however, expect a higher cutoff the
expected upward shift can be higher, making waiting in turn more attractive.
Recall that if the variance of the prior is (infinitely) large, i believes j’s posterior
mean to be equally likely to lie above or below hers—independent of her posterior mean.
11Throughout the paper, f denotes the p.d.f. of a standard normal distribution.
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Figure 1: Shape of κ2X (κ1(µ− Θ¯)) for Θ¯ = 0 and Θ¯ = 1.
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Figure 2: Three different equilibria.
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Figure 3: A change in τ may lead to multiple equilibria problems.
The cutoff type’s expected upward shift in this case is thus independent of her posterior
mean. Hence, as the variance of the prior becomes large, the expected upward shift tends
towards a constant and therefore the slope of κ2X tends to zero. But whenever the slope
of κ2X is less than one everywhere, Figure 2 implies that equilibrium must be unique.
Thus, for a high enough variance of the prior, equilibrium is unique. Similarly, as the
agent’s signal becomes infinitely precise (i.e. as σ2ǫ → 0) she believes that she is in the
center of the world and the expected upward shift tends to a constant. Thus, equilibrium
is also unique in this case. Furthermore, if the future becomes heavily discounted the
gain of waiting and the slope of κ2X tend to zero, and thus the unique equilibrium cutoff
approaches τ in this case.
Of course, even if the maximal slope of κ2X is greater than one, equilibrium may be
unique. For example, if the gain of investing µ− τ crosses the function κ2X far enough
in the right tail, equilibrium is unique. Similarly, if it crosses κ2X where its slope is
positive but sufficiently low, equilibrium will be unique. Whether it does so, however,
depends on the tax rate as illustrated in Figure 3. In the Figure a decrease in the tax
from τ ′ to τ ′′, leads to the existence of multiple equilibria. More generally, whenever the
maximal slope of κ2X is greater than one, there exists a tax rate τ for which the waiting
game has multiple equilibria. Furthermore, we have argued above that a unit increase
in Θ¯ leads to a translation by one unit to the right of κ2X . Hence, for any finite τ ,
one can reduce Θ¯ until the equilibrium condition 5 is satisfied in the right tail of κ2X .
Similarly, for any finite τ we can increase Θ¯ until µ − τ cuts κ2X in its left tail. Thus
12
for sufficiently high or sufficiently low Θ¯, equilibrium is unique. The insights present in
this section are summarized below:
Proposition 1. If
(6)
∂κ2X
(
κ1(µ− Θ¯)
)
∂µ
≤ 1, ∀µ
there exists a unique equilibrium. Furthermore, inequality 6 is satisfied if either:
1. σ2Θ > (σ
2
Θ)
c for a given (σ2Θ)
c <∞, or
2. σ2ǫ < (σ
2
ǫ )
c for a given (σ2ǫ )
c > 0, or
3. δ ≤ δc, for a given δc > 0.
If inequality 6 is not satisfied, there exist values of Θ¯ that support multiple equilibria.
For any given tax rate τ , however, equilibrium is still unique if either
4. θ¯ ≤ τ , or
5. θ¯ ≥ θ¯u for a given θ¯u <∞.
4 Policy
It is easy to check that, from the planner’s point of view, µi is normally distributed with
mean Θ¯ and with some variance denoted by σ2µ.
12 Define µ as the posterior mean which
ensures that E(Θ|µ, µj > µ
∗) = τ .13 In equilibrium all types with a posterior mean
12In Section 3 we argued that i’s posterior mean µi is a weighted average between her signal and the
prior mean. Formally, µi = αsi + (1− α)Θ¯ (where α ∈ [0, 1] depends on the prior and signal variances).
By assumption si = Θ + ǫi, where Θ ∼ N(Θ¯, σ
2
Θ) and ǫi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ ). As ǫi is independent of Θ, from
the planner’s point of view si ∼ N(Θ¯, σ
2
Θ + σ
2
ǫ ). Hence, µi is the sum of a normally distributed random
variable (multiplied by α) with mean Θ¯ and a constant (i.e. (1 − α)Θ¯). As is well known, this implies
that µi ∼ N(Θ¯, σ
2
µ) where σ
2
µ = α
2(σ2Θ + σ
2
ǫ ).
13In the Appendix (see Lemma 6) we prove that for any first-period cutoff µ∗, there exists a unique
µ. Intuitively, since observing player j investing makes a cutoff-type i more optimistic, it is obvious
that µ < µ∗. Formally, the result follows immediately from Lemma 3, which can also be found in the
Appendix.
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higher than µ∗ invest at time one, all types with a posterior mean between µ and µ∗
invest at time two only if the other player invested at time one, and all types with a
posterior mean lower than µ never invest. Time-zero expected welfare W can thus be
written as:
W =
∫ ∞
µ∗
µif
(
µi − Θ¯
σµ
)
dµi + δ
∫ µ∗
µ
Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi)E(Θ|µi, µj > µ
∗)f
(
µi − Θ¯
σµ
)
dµi.
The first integral represents the weighted expected utility of all types that invest at
time one. The second integral represents the weighted gross gain of waiting of all the
inframarginal types. The social planner chooses τ to maximize W . Observe that τ
does not enter directly into the welfare calculation. Implicitly, we assume that any tax
collected by (or subsidy paid by) the government is costlessly redistributed to (or taxed
from) other risk-neutral participants in the economy. Therefore, τ only affects welfare
indirectly through its effect on µ∗ and µ. We first observe that a social planner never
sets an infinitely high tax or subsidy.
Lemma 2. There exists τ , τ¯ ∈ R such that for all τ ≥ τ¯ and for all τ ≤ τ , a planner can
raise welfare by setting τ equal to zero.
Intuitively, if the investment tax is “too” high, players with very optimistic beliefs
postpone their investment plans. Similarly, if the investment subsidy is “too” high,
players with very pessimistic beliefs are induced to invest. In both cases the planner
can raise welfare by simply eliminating the investment tax (or subsidy). Throughout
this section, we also assume that ∀τ ∈ [τ , τ¯ ] the equilibrium in symmetric switching
strategies is unique. In the light of Proposition 1, this is equivalent to assuming that
either inequality 6 is satisfied, or that the prior mean θ¯ ≤ τ , or that θ¯ is sufficiently high.
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Differentiating the above welfare function, one has:
dW
dτ
= −
dµ∗
dτ
[
µ∗ − δ Pr(µj > µ
∗|µ∗)E(Θ|µ∗, µj > µ
∗)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ∗’s gross gain of investing early
f
(
µ∗ − Θ¯
σµ
)
−
dµ
dτ
δ
[
Pr(µj > µ
∗|µ)E(Θ|µ, µj > µ
∗)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ’s gross gain of investing late
f
(
µ− Θ¯
σµ
)
.
+
dµ∗
dτ
δ
∫ µ∗
µ
∂
∂µ∗
[
Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi)E(Θ|µi, µj > µ
∗)
]
f
(
µi − Θ¯
σµ
)
dµi.︸ ︷︷ ︸
weighted change in the inframarginal types’ gross gain of waiting
It follows from 2 that the first term between square brackets is equal to τ(1− δ Pr(µj >
µ∗|µ∗)). By definition of µ, E(Θ|µ, µj > µ
∗) = τ . Hence, the above derivative can be
written as:
dW
dτ
= −
dµ∗
dτ
[
1− δ Pr(µj > µ
∗|µ∗)
]
τf
(
µ∗ − Θ¯
σµ
)
−
dµ
dτ
δ Pr(µj > µ
∗|µ)τf
(
µ− Θ¯
σµ
)
(7)
+
dµ∗
dτ
δ
∫ µ∗
µ
∂
∂µ∗
[
Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi)E(Θ|µi, µj > µ
∗)
]
f
(
µi − Θ¯
σµ
)
dµi.
An increase in τ represents a parallel shift of µ− τ to the right (see Figure 3). As κ2X is
independent of τ , dµ∗/dτ > 0 whenever the symmetric switching equilibrium is unique.
Intuitively, increasing the investment tax makes it less attractive both to invest early
and to invest late. When deciding to wait, however, the first-period cutoff type only pays
the tax upon receiving good news. Thus, increasing the tax raises the incentives to wait
and therefore µ∗ increases. In Lemma 7 we also show that dµ/dτ > 0 when Θ¯ is higher
than Θ¯c1 or lower than Θ¯c2 . This is not implausible either: As an increase in τ reduces
the net return from investing, the time-two marginal type must be more confident about
its gross returns.14
14Observe, however, that this result is only valid when Θ¯ is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low.
For “intermediate” values of Θ¯, µ may decrease in τ . The intuition behind this counterintuitive result is
explained in more detail below.
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It follows from 7 and from our previous paragraph that whenever investments are
subsidized (i.e. ∀τ ≤ 0), dW/dτ > 0 if Θ¯ > Θ¯c1 and if
(8) ∀µi ∈ [µ, µ
∗],
∂
∂µ∗
[Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi)E(Θ|µi, µj > µ
∗)] > 0.
In words, if the above conditions are satisfied, the social planner starting from any
nonpositive tax rate can strictly increase welfare by raising the tax rate τ , implying that
investments should be taxed (i.e. τ∗ > 0). It can be checked that i’s gross gain of waiting
is unimodal in µ∗ for the same reason as X is unimodal in µ: if µ∗ increases, the event
µj > µ
∗ becomes less likely, which, ceteris paribus, reduces i’s gross gain of waiting. An
increase in µ∗, however, also increases the upward shift in i’s posterior mean when j
invests, which, ceteris paribus, increases i’s gross gain of waiting. Player i’s gross gain
of waiting is thus maximized at some intermediate value of µ. If µ∗ lies below this value,
the second effect dominates and i’s gross gain of waiting is increasing in µ∗. The first
effect dominates whenever µ∗ lies above this value.
As explained in Section 3, j’s posterior mean is a weighted average between his sig-
nal sj and the prior mean Θ¯. Furthermore, i believes j’s signal to be symmetrically
distributed around her best guess of the state of the world, i.e. her posterior mean µi.
Therefore, i’s expectation of j’s posterior mean (i.e. E(µj |µi)) lies between her posterior
mean µi and the prior mean Θ¯. This implies that the more Θ¯ lies above µ
∗, the more
likely i believes j to invest. Formally, keeping µ∗ fixed, Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi = µ
∗) is increasing
in Θ¯. Therefore, the cutoff player’s expected upward shift is small when Θ¯ is high and
her gross gain of waiting is thus increasing in µ∗. As the inframarginal types’s posteriors
are even lower than µ∗, they also all agree that µ∗ is too low and want the social planner
to raise it via taxes.
A similar, though more subtle, argument also holds when the prior mean becomes
very negative. The subtlety stems from the fact that µ is decreasing in the prior mean:
The lower the prior mean, the higher the upward shift in Player i’s posterior mean.15
15In Lemma 4, which can be found in the Appendix, we prove that E(Θ|µi, µj > µ
∗) = µi +
κ2h(
µ∗−αµi−(1−α)Θ¯
σo
), where σo is some positive constant. As in equation 4, the upward shift in Player
16
Hence, when the prior mean becomes very negative some types with a very negative
(time-one) posterior mean may end up investing at time two. It is important to stress
that those types invest at time two not because their time-one posterior mean was “not
that low”. Instead, those types invest because they experience a huge upward shift upon
observing their rival investing at time one. Hence, types with very negative time-one
posterior means want the social planner to choose τ to increase their expected upward
shift to the largest possible extent. In particular, this implies that types with posterior
means close to (but greater than) µ think that µ∗ is too low and want the social planner
to raise it via taxes. Types with posterior means not close to µ, however, view things
differently. Conditional upon getting good news, those types invest at time two, not so
much because they experience a huge upward shift in their posterior beliefs, but rather
because their time-one posterior means were not that low in the first place. When the
prior mean is very negative, those types think that the probability of getting good news
is too low. Hence, they want the social planner to reduce µ∗ by subsidizing investments.
When the prior mean becomes very negative, the social planner thus faces a tradeoff: she
needs to weigh the benefit of a decrease in µ∗ for the inframarginal types with not very
low time-one posterior means against the losses of those types with time-one posterior
means close to µ. As this exercise is analytically demanding, we have not been able to
prove that a (strictly positive) subsidy is optimal when the prior mean is sufficiently
low. Nevertheless, we establish that as the prior mean tends to minus infinity, the mass
of types who prefer the social planner to tax investments tends to zero.16 This result
enables us to show that if τ > 0, the social planner can raise welfare by reducing the
investment tax when Θ¯ is below some critical value. This results also implies that in the
limit (i.e. as Θ¯ → −∞), τ∗ ≤ 0.
Both results are summarized below:
i’s beliefs is thus captured by the term κ2h(·). This implies that the more negative µi or Θ¯, the higher
the expected upward shift.
16For any finite prior mean, however, there always exist some types who prefer the social planner to
tax investments.
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Figure 4: Optimal tax or subsidy as a function of the prior mean.
Proposition 2. If the prior mean Θ¯ is sufficiently high, it is optimal for the social
planer to tax investments (τ∗ > 0). Conversely, any positive investment tax (τ > 0) is
suboptimally high if Θ¯ lies below some threshold Θ¯c(τ).
Figure 4 shows τ∗ (i.e. the optimal tax/subsidy) as a function of the prior mean
when all the exogenous variances (i.e. σ2ǫ and σ
2
Θ) are equal to one. For low values of
the prior mean, the social planner should subsidize investment. Once the prior mean
crosses some critical level, investments should be taxed.17 As explained above, if the
prior mean is sufficiently high the social planner increases the expected upward shift
of all inframarginal types when taxing investment. Thus when stories about the high
profitability of an investment opportunity abound, it is optimal to tax investments.
17In this example, the “subtlety” which we explained in our previous paragraph is thus irrelevant: the
social planner subsidizes investments because with a low prior mean a large mass of inframarginal types
fear that the other player will not invest. Thus, although there are always types who want the social
planner to tax investments, these types’ losses are overcompensated by the gains to inframarginal types
with higher time-one posteriors.
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Proposition 2 extends intuition about the insufficient use of private information de-
rived in the original herding papers (see Banerjee (1992) and Bhikhchandani et al.
(1992)) to an endogenous queue set-up. In an informational cascade, Player i gets
say sufficiently good public information about the returns from investing, which arises
when enough predecessors in a queue decide to invest, so that she follows the public
information and invests even when possessing an unfavorable private signal. This invest-
ment decision is typically socially inefficient as it impedes subsequent movers to infer
this player’s signal from her action. A similar inefficiency also arises in our model: if the
public information is very favorable (i.e. if Θ¯ is sufficiently high), an inefficiently high
mass of types end up investing, making it harder for players who wait to confidently
infer that the state of the world is indeed conducive to investing.
According to (perhaps recent) conventional wisdom, governments should not intervene
in the presence of an investment bubble as one cannot ex ante know whether it is due to
fundamentals (corresponding to the case in which Θ > 0 in our model) or whether it is
the result of incorrect beliefs of the private actors. Alan Greenspan, for example, wrote:
“How do you draw the line between a healthy, exciting economic boom and a
. . . bubble . . . ? ... After thinking a great deal about this, I decided that ... the
Fed would not second-guess “hundreds of thousands of informed investors.”
Instead the Fed would position itself to protect the economy in the event of
a crash.” (Greenspan, 2008, pages 200-1)
Our model questions this rationale for non-intervention: even if policymakers in contrast
to market participants receive no private signal about the state of the world, the poli-
cymakers’ prior knowledge of Θ¯ can still be used to improve welfare.18 In particular, in
the presence of sufficiently favorable public information, investments should be taxed.
18Greenspan was primarily worried about the existence of an investment boom in the U.S. stockmarket,
i.e. in a context in which prices supposedly aggregate information. As our model is void of any price
mechanism, one might argue that Greenspan’s quote does not really apply to our set-up. We feel,
however, that (perhaps until recently) the vast majority of policy-makers would agree (or would have
agreed) with Greenspan even in a fixed-price context.
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More broadly, Proposition 2 is consistent with the idea that investment policy should
be countercyclical: when Θ¯ is high (i.e. when expected investment activity is high),
investments should be taxed, while if Θ¯ → −∞ (i.e. when expected investment activity
is zero) investment should not be taxed. Indeed, in the concrete example above an
investment subsidy becomes optimal once the state of the world is sufficiently bad.
5 Is total investment activity decreasing in τ?
Denote by µ0 and µ′ the first-period equilibrium cutoffs respectively when τ = 0 and
when τ = τ ′ > 0. Similarly, denote by µ0 and µ′, the second-period equilibrium cutoffs
respectively when τ = 0 and when τ = τ ′. In our previous section, we argued that
dµ∗/dτ > 0, i.e. the indifferent type at time one must possess a higher posterior to
compensate for the increase in τ . Hence, µ0 < µ′ and an increase in the tax rate τ cannot
increase the number of time-one investments. Now consider the effect on the second-
period cutoff. When the tax rises, it also reduces i’s ex-post payoff of investing late—the
direct effect. Ceteris paribus, this effect thus increases the second-period cutoff. The
tax change, however, also favorably affects the upward shift in i’s posterior mean when j
invests—the indirect effect. Ceteris paribus, this decreases µ. Intuitively, if j—despite a
higher investment tax—still invests, this means that his posterior mean lies above µ′ and
not µ0. In words, if τ increases and j invests, this is “excellent” instead of “good” news.
In the Appendix, we prove that—depending on the values of the parameters—either
effect can dominate. If the direct effect dominates, (i.e. if µ0 < µ′), total investment
activity cannot increase when τ goes from zero to τ ′. If the indirect effect dominates (i.e.
if µ′ < µ0), total investment activity may increase after an increase in τ . This is easy to
see: suppose (µ1, µ2) are such that µ1 > µ
′ and that µ2 ∈ (µ
′, µ0). Then, without the
tax only player one invests, while with τ = τ ′, both players end up investing. Observe
that dµ/dτ may be negative despite our assumption that taxes are permanent. If the
government were only to impose a period-one tax, the direct effect would disappear and
trivially µ′ < µ0.
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Consider now the extreme case in which δ = 0. In this case, the first-period cutoff
µ∗ = τ . Hence, if the tax τ increases by dτ units, so does the first-period cutoff. When
δ is very high, the positive effect of an increase in the tax on µ∗ is also relatively “low”.
One reason is that for a higher δ, the future tax cost is discounted by less. Another, more
subtle, reason is best understood in the limit equilibrium as δ → 1. As the (opportunity)
cost of waiting is arbitrarily small, in equilibrium the gain of waiting must be close to
zero. Hence, when getting bad news (i.e. when µcj < µ
∗) a first-period cutoff type must
be indifferent between investing or not in period two.19 Thus, one can equivalently think
of her as investing in period two also after receiving bad news, which implies that she
cannot escape the cost of taxation through waiting. Therefore, her incentives to wait are
unaffected by the tax rate, which limits the extent to which µ∗ increases. (Nevertheless,
of course, in the limit equilibrium a first-period cutoff player must also be indifferent
between investing and not investing when getting bad news, and an increase in the tax
rate makes investing late less attractive; thus the first-period cutoff increases.) When
δ = 0 or when δ is close to one, a change in the tax τ does thus not have a “big” effect on
µ∗.20 As the effect on µ∗ is relatively small, an increase in the tax τ does not increase the
upward shift in i’s posterior mean by “much” in these limit cases. This explains why in
both limit cases the direct effect dominates. Our most important results are summarized
below:
Proposition 3. Suppose condition 6 is satisfied. Increasing the tax rate τ increases µ∗
and, thus, weakly decreases first-period investment activity. Increasing the tax rate τ ,
however, can either increase or decrease µ. If dµ/dτ < 0, an increase in the tax rate τ
may increase overall investment activity. Nevertheless, if players are either sufficiently
19Formally, this intuitive fact follows from equation 21 in the Appendix.
20When the prior mean is sufficiently high and when the discount factor takes “intermediate” values,
a change in τ can have a much bigger effect on µ∗. Recall from the discussion of Figure 1 above that
waiting decisions are strategic complements if the prior mean is sufficiently high. Hence, if—due to an
increase in τ—Player j increases her cutoff level, this induces Player i to increase her cutoff by more
than the tax increase.
21
impatient or sufficiently patient, increasing the tax rate increases µ and, hence, also
decreases overall investment activity.
6 Extensions
6.1 Asymmetric equilibria in switching strategies
We now provide a simple sufficient condition that rules out any asymmetric equilibrium
in switching strategies.21 Remember that µIi denotes the value of µi such that i is
indifferent between investing and waiting given that j invests if and only if her posterior
exceeds µcj . In the Appendix we prove that µ
I
i initially increases and then decreases in
µcj . The intuition behind this result is identical to the one that explains the unimodality
of X : if µcj increases, this reduces the likelihood that j invests. Ceteris paribus, this
reduces a player’s gain of waiting and, thus, reduces µIi . An increase in µ
c
j , however,
also increases the upward shift in i’s posterior mean when Player j invests. Ceteris
paribus, this increases µIi . For low values of µ
c
j , the second effect dominates, while the
first one dominates once µcj passes a critical threshold level. As mentioned in Section
3, the symmetric equilibrium cutoff µ∗ can be graphically represented by the point in
which µIi (µ
c
j) crosses the 45
◦-line. Suppose µIi (µ
c
j) crosses the 45
◦-line when
dµIi
dµcj
> 0.
Asymmetric equilibria can then be ruled out as illustrated in Figure 5. In that Figure
(µci )
−1
(
µIj
)
represents the inverse of µIj (µ
c
i ). By symmetry of our set-up, µ
I
j (µ
c
i ) has
the same shape as µIi (µ
c
j). Therefore, (µ
c
i )
−1
(
µIj
)
represents the rotated (over the 45◦-
line) image of µIi (µ
c
j). Using symmetry as well as that
dµIi
dµcj
∣∣∣
µi=µ∗
> 0, and that µIi (µ
c
j)
is unimodal, this implies that both functions cannot cross at a point that does not
lie on the 45◦-line. Hence, if
dµIi
dµcj
∣∣∣
µi=µ∗
> 0, there exists no asymmetric equilibrium.
If, additionally, condition 6 is satisfied, equilibrium is unique within the class of the
switching strategies as illustrated in Figure 5. Furthermore, in the Appendix we also
show that
dµIi
dµcj
∣∣∣
µi=µ∗
> 0 is equivalent to ∂X (κ1(µ−Θ¯))
∂µ
∣∣∣
µ=µ∗
> 0.
21In an asymmetric equilibrium in switching strategies player i invests at time one if and only if her
posterior lies above µ∗i (where µ
∗
i 6= µ
∗
j ).
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Figure 5: No asymmetric equilibria.
As illustrated in Figure 1, an increase in Θ¯ shifts X to the right. Hence, if Θ¯ is
above some threshold level X is increasing at the equilibrium cutoff, which rules out
asymmetric equilibria in switching strategies. To summarize:
Proposition 4. If ∂X (κ1(µ−Θ¯))
∂µ
, evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium, is positive,
there exists no asymmetric equilibrium in switching strategies. Furthermore, for all po-
tentially optimal tax levels, the condition is satisfied if the prior mean is sufficiently
high.
6.2 The N-player case
Consider the case in which players have a Laplacian prior. As argued in Section 3, Player
i’s posterior mean is then equal to her signal and she—independent of her signal—believes
to be in the “center of the world”, i.e. there is a 50%-chance that j possesses a higher
signal than herself. As explained in Section 3, those beliefs yield a unique equilibrium in
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the two-player case. It is, however, easy to prove that those beliefs also yield a unique
equilibrium within the class of the symmetric switching strategies for any number of
players N .
To see this, let ∆(µi, µ
c) denote the difference between i’s gain of investing and her
gain of waiting given her posterior µi and given that all players invest at time one if and
only if their posteriors exceed µc. Formally,
(9) ∆(µi, µ
c) = µi − τ − δ
N−1∑
n=1
Pr(n|µi)max
{
0, E(Θ|µi, n)− τ
}
,
where E(Θ|µi, n) denotes i’s expectation of Θ given her time-one posterior mean µi and
given that n players invested at time one.
Note that if µi < τ , i’s expected payoff from investing at time one is negative. Hence,
independent of the other players’ strategies, she strictly prefers to wait in the first period.
In particular, this implies that ∆(µi, µ
c = µi) is negative for sufficiently low values of
µi. Furthermore, a strategy in which i always waits is dominated as well. To see this,
suppose that if i waits, she perfectly learns the state of the world. Player i’s gain of
waiting then equals δ Pr(Θ > 0|µi)E(Θ|µi,Θ > 0). Observe that for a high enough
time-one posterior µi, E(Θ|µi,Θ > 0) ≈ E(Θ|µi) = µi. Hence, there exists a µ¯ such that
µ¯ = δPr(Θ > 0|µ¯)E(Θ|µ¯,Θ > 0). Thus for posteriors µi ≥ µ¯ Player i would not want
to wait even if she would learn the state of the world perfectly when waiting. Hence,
for high enough time-one posteriors Player i is strictly better off investing at time one—
independent of the other players’ strategies. This implies that ∆(µi = µ¯, µ
c = µ¯) > 0.
Observe that trivially
µi − τ =
N−1∑
n=1
Pr(n|µi)
(
E(Θ|µi, n)− τ
)
.
The above equality allows us to rewrite ∆(µi, µ
c = µi) as:
∆(µi, µ
c = µi) = (1− δ)
N−1∑
n=1
Pr(n|µi)max
{
0, E(Θ|µi, n)− τ
}
(10)
+
N−1∑
n=1
Pr(n|µi)min
{
0, E(Θ|µi, n)− τ
}
.
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As signals are independently drawn,
Pr(n|µi) =
(N − 1)!
n!(N − n− 1)!
Pr(µj > µi|µi)
n Pr(µj < µi|µi)
N−n−1.
As argued above, if players have a Laplacian prior i believes to be in the “center of the
world”, which implies that Pr(µj > µi|µi) =
1
2 . Hence, when players have a Laplacian
prior Pr(n|µi) is independent of µi. This insight, combined with the fact that E(Θ|µi, n)
is strictly increasing in µi, allows us to conclude that ∆(µi, µ
c = µi) is strictly increasing
in µi. It then follows from our previous paragraph that there exists a unique candidate
equilibrium cutoff µ∗ such that ∆(µ∗, µ∗) = 0. In the Appendix we show that ∆(µi, µ
∗) >
0 ⇔ µi > µ
∗, thereby establishing that this cutoff indeed characterizes a symmetric
switching equilibrium. Summarizing:
Proposition 5. Suppose players have a Laplacian prior. For any finite number of
players N , there exists a unique symmetric switching equilibrium.
7 Final Remarks
We analyzed some policy implications of social learning when players are fully rational
and have better information than the policymaker. Our model is particularly useful when
public information is conducive to investing—which typically happens during “boom
times”. In this case, we establish that in the unique switching equilibrium investments
should be taxed.
We haven chosen a two-player setup for our model. The general N player game is
difficult to analyze. One “simple” alternative, however, would be to consider a model
with a continuum of players. In that variation, for any given symmetric equilibrium
cutoff, social learning would be perfect and hence a laissez-faire policy optimal. To
circumvent this unrealistic feature, one needs to assume social learning to be imperfect.
One possibility is to assume observational noise as in Chamley (2004a) or Dasgupta
(2007). In such a setup, Player i’s distribution about the other players’ posterior means
(i.e. f(µj |µi)) would still be computed in the same way as in our two-player model.
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Therefore, if the prior mean is “very high” an inframarginal type expects—for “many”
realizations of the state of the world—a large mass of players to invest at time one. As
noisy observation of past investment behavior is then expected to reveal relatively little
information about the realized state of the world, we conjecture that the inframarginal
types then also prefer the social planner to raise the equilibrium cutoff via taxes. One
drawback of such an approach, however, is that the observational noise is completely
exogenously specified. An alternative assumption is that each player can only observe
some (neighboring) players first-period decision.22
In our model information can only be transmitted through actions. As there are no
payoff externalities, it is natural to ask why information cannot be transmitted through
words instead. If players can fully exchange their private information via cheap talk,
an efficient equilibrium of course exists. We feel, however, that this simple argument
is misleading as communication—even where allowed and feasible—is often imperfect.
Suppose, for example, that player one is asked to reveal her type to the other player(s)
prior to the waiting game. As her signal is imperfect, she also wants to learn the other
player(s)’ signal(s). She therefore has an incentive to send the message which maximizes
her gain of waiting. In an analysis of cheap talk, Gossner and Melissas (2006) have shown
that this game may—depending on the values of the parameters—be characterized by a
unique monotone equilibrium in which all types send the same message, i.e. information
can only be revealed through actions. More generally, we believe the study of waiting
games in the presence of imperfect communication to be an interesting avenue for future
research.
Another noteworthy aspect of our model is that investment costs are exogenous.23
In many applications in which policymakers are concerned about investment bubbles—
such as stock market or housing market bubbles—one would expect investment costs to
increase in the number of present and past investments. In an exogenous queue model
22Our model, for example, can be seen as a special case in which countably many players live on a
circle and each player only observes her right-hand neighbor.
23See also the discussion in Footnote 18.
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with a competitive market maker, Avery and Zemsky (1998) establish that herding
does not occur with one dimensional information but does occur with multi-dimensional
information. An interesting question for future research is how these results extend to
endogenous queue setting and whether it is also optimal to tax investments during booms
times in such a model.
For simplicity we assumed that players are fully rational. Eyster and Rabin (2009)
nicely highlight some counterintuitive features of the rational learning model in an ex-
ogenous queue environment and propose a plausible alternative learning model. An
interesting question is whether the introduction of inferentially naive and/or cursed
players strengthens or qualifies our “taxation during booms” result in an endogenous
queue environment.
Appendix
Definitions and Preliminaries
Throughout the appendix F , f , h, and r represent, respectively, the c.d.f., the p.d.f., the
hazard rate
(
≡ f(·)1−F (·)
)
, and the reverse hazard rate
(
≡ f(·)
F (·)
)
of the standard normal
distribution. We will also use the following notations: α ≡
σ2Θ
σ2Θ+σ
2
ǫ
, β ≡
2
σ2ǫ
1
σ2
Θ
+ 2
σ2ǫ
, σ2p ≡
σ2Θσ
2
ǫ
σ2Θ+σ
2
ǫ
, σ22 ≡ σ
2
p + σ
2
ǫ , σ
2
o ≡ α
2σ22, σ
2
µ ≡ α
2(σ2Θ + σ
2
ǫ ), κ1 ≡
1−α
σo
, κ2 ≡
1
2βσ2, x(µ
c
j , µi) ≡
µcj−αµi−(1−α)Θ¯
σo
, X (η) ≡ δf(η)1−δ(1−F (η)) , g(µ) ≡ µ − τ − κ2X (κ1(µ − Θ¯)), φ(µ) ≡ µ − τ +
κ2h(x(µ
∗, µ)), and µ˜ ≡ (1− α)Θ¯− µ∗.
In our set-up (see DeGroot (1984) for proofs) Θ|si ∼ N(µi, σ
2
p), where
(11) µi = αsi + (1− α)Θ¯.
As ǫj is independent from Θ and ǫi, sj |si = Θ|si + ǫj . As ǫj ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ ), sj |si ∼
N(µi, σ
2
p + σ
2
ǫ ). Furthermore, µj = αsj + (1− α)Θ¯, and thus,
(12) µj |si ∼ N(αµi + (1− α)Θ¯, σ
2
o).
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Hence, Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi) = 1− F
(
µ∗−αµi−(1−α)Θ¯
σo
)
, and
Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi = µ
∗) = 1− F
(
κ1
(
µ∗ − Θ¯
))
.
Proof of Lemma 1
We first state and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If signals and the state of the world are drawn from Normal distributions,
1 >
∂E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)
∂µ1
>
∂E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)
∂µc2
> 0,
and
∂E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2)
∂µ1
> 0.
Proof: A well known statistical result (see DeGroot (1984) for a proof) is that if Θ ∼
N(Θ¯, σ2Θ) and if ǫi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ ), then Θ|s1, s2 also tends to a normal and
(13) E(Θ|s1, s2) = β
s1 + s2
2
+ (1− β)Θ¯.
We first tackle the case in which µ2 > µ
c
2. It follows from 11 that µ2 > µ
c
2 ⇔ s2 > s
c
2 ≡
µc2−(1−α)Θ¯
α
. One has,
E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2) =
∫
[β
s1 + s2
2
+ (1− β)Θ¯]f(s2|s1, s2 ≥ s
c
2)ds2,
=
β
2
s1 +
β
2
E(s2|s1, s2 > s
c
2) + (1− β)Θ.(14)
From the explanations provided after 11, we know that s2|s1, s2 > s
c
2 is a left-truncated
normal distribution with mean µ1, variance σ
2
2 and truncation point s
c
2. Using Johnson
et al. (1995) to calculate the expectation of a truncated normal variable, one has
(15) E(s2|s1, s2 > s
c
2) = µ1 + h
(
sc2 − µ1
σ2
)
σ2.
Inserting 15 into 14 and differentiating, establishes that
(16)
∂E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)
∂µ1
=
β
2

 1
α
+ 1−
∂h(z)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z=
sc2−µ1
σ2

 .
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Inserting 15 into 14 and differentiating with respect to µc2, one has
(17)
∂E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)
∂µc2
=
β
2α
∂h(z)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z=
sc2−µ1
σ2
.
As is well known (see, e.g. Greene (1993), Theorem 22.2), the slope of the hazard rate of
a standard normal distribution, h′(z) ∈ (0, 1) ∀z. This insight, combined with the fact
that both α and β are positive, allows us to conclude that
∂E(Θ|µ1,µ2>µc2)
∂µc2
> 0.
It follows from 16 and 17 that
∂E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)
∂µ1
>
∂E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)
∂µc2
⇔ 1 >
∂h(z)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z=
sc2−µ1
σ2
,
which is satisfied.
Observe that β2 (
1
α
+ 1) = 1. This observation, combined with our earlier result that
h′(z) > 0, allows us to conclude that
∂E(Θ|µ1,µ2>µc2)
∂µ1
< 1.
We now tackle the case in which µ2 < µ
c
2. As above,
(18) E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2) =
β
2
s1 +
β
2
E(s2|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2) + (1− β)Θ.
From Johnson et al (1995), we know that
(19) E(s2|µ1, s2 < s
c
2) = µ1 − r
(
sc2 − µ1
σ2
)
σ2.
Inserting 19 into 18 and differentiating yields
(20)
∂E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2)
∂µ1
=
β
2

 1
α
+ 1 +
∂r(z)
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z=
sc2−µ1
σ2

 .
It is well known (see, e.g. Greene (1993), Theorem 22.2) that r′(·) ∈ (−1, 0). Hence,
∂E(Θ|µ1,µ2<µc2)
∂µ1
is positive.
Observe that for any finite µ1 and µ
c
2, E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2) < E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2). There
are thus three possibilities:
(i) E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2)− τ < E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)− τ ≤ 0,
(ii) E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2)− τ ≤ 0 < E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)− τ , and
(iii) 0 < E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2)− τ < E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)− τ .
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In case (i), ∆(·) = µ1 − τ , which is increasing in µ1.
In case (ii), ∆(·) = µ1 − τ − δ Pr(µ2 > µ
c
2|µ1)[E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)− τ ]. Observe that
µ1 − τ = Pr(µ2 > µ
c
2|µ1)[E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)− τ ] + Pr(µ2 < µ
c
2|µ1)[E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2)− τ ].
Inserting this last equality into ∆(·), yields
(21) ∆(·) = (1− δ) Pr(µ2 > µ
c
2|µ1)[E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)− τ ] + Pr(µ2 < µ
c
2|µ1)[E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2)− τ ].
Differentiating this last expression of ∆(·) yields:
∂∆(µ1, µ
c
2)
∂µ1
= (1− δ)
∂ Pr(µ2 > µ
c
2|µ1)
∂µ1
[E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)− τ ]
+ (1− δ)
∂E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)
∂µ1
Pr(µ2 > µ
c
2|µ1)(22)
+
∂ Pr(µ2 < µ
c
2|µ1)
∂µ1
[E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2)− τ ]
+
∂E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2)
∂µ1
Pr(µ2 < µ
c
2|µ1).
In case (ii), E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2)− τ > 0. As
∂ Pr(µ2>µc2|µ1)
∂µ1
is also positive, the first term of
the RHS of 22 is positive. Moreover, from Lemma 3 we know that both
∂E(Θ|µ1,µ2>µc2)
∂µ1
and
∂E(Θ|µ1,µ2<µc2)
∂µ1
are positive. Hence, the second and the fourth term of the RHS of
22 are also positive. In case (ii), E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2)− τ ≤ 0. This assumption, combined
with the fact that
∂ Pr(µ2<µc2|µ1)
∂µ1
< 0, proves that the third term of the RHS of 22 is also
positive.
Finally, in case (iii) ∆(·) = (1− δ)(µ1 − τ), which is also increasing in µ1.
Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that κ1 =
1−α
σo
, κ2 =
1
2βσ2, σ2 =
√
σ2p + σ
2
ǫ and that x(µ
c
2, µ1) =
µc2−αµ1−(1−α)Θ¯
σo
.
We first state and prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2) = µ1 + κ2h(x(µ
c
2, µ1)).
Proof: It follows from 11 that µ2 > µ
c
2 ⇔ s2 > s
c
2, where s
c
2 =
µc2−(1−α)Θ¯
α
. Triv-
ially, E(Θ|s1, s2) = E(Θ|µ1, µ2). Hence, E(Θ|µ1, µ2 > µ
c
2) =
∫
E(Θ|s1, s2)f(s2|s1, s2 >
30
sc2)ds2. Using 13, one has
(23) E(Θ|s1, s2 > s
c
2) =
β
2
s1 + (1− β)Θ¯ +
β
2
∫
s2f(s2|s1, s2 > s
c
2)ds2.
The integral in the equation above represents E(s2|s1, s2 > s
c
2). After 11, we argued
that s2|s1, s2 > s
c
2 is a left-truncated normal distribution with mean µ1, variance σ
2
2 and
truncation point sc2, and from Johnson et al. (1995), we know that
(24) E(s2|s1, s2 > s
c
2) = µ1 +
f(
sc2−µ1
σ2
)
1− F (
sc2−µ1
σ2
)
σ2.
Replacing sc2 by
µc2−(1−α)Θ¯
α
and taking into account that σ2o = α
2(σ2p +σ
2
ǫ ) = α
2σ22, allow
us to rewrite 24 as E(s2|s1, s2 > s
c
2) = µ1 + h(x(µ
c
2, µ1))σ2. Inserting this last equality
into 23, and taking into account the fact that µ1 = αs1 + (1− α)Θ¯, one has
E(Θ|s1, s2 ≥ s
c
2) =
1
2
β(1 + α)s1 +
1
2
(2− β(1 + α))Θ¯ +
1
2
βh(x(µc2, µ1))σ2.
It is easy to check that β(1 + α) = 2α. Substituting this equality into our expectation
proves the lemma.
Recall that
(25) X (η) =
δf(η)
1− δ(1− F (η))
.
Lemma 5. There exists a unique ηˆ < 0 such that X (ηˆ) = −ηˆ. X (η) increases until η = ηˆ,
after which it decreases. limη→−∞X (η) = limη→+∞X (η) = 0 and limη→−∞X
′(η) =
limη→+∞X
′(η) = 0. X ′′(η) > 0 if η < ηm (where ηm < ηˆ) and X ′′(η) < 0 if η ∈ (ηm, ηˆ).
limδ→1 ηˆ = −∞. limδ→0X
′(ηm) = 0 and limδ→1X
′(ηm) = ∞.
Proof: Observe that X (η) > 0 for δ > 0. Hence, X (η) > −η, ∀η > 0. Mere introspection
of 25 reveals that for sufficiently low values of η, X (η) < −η. By continuity, there exists
at least one ηˆ < 0 such that X (ηˆ) = −ηˆ. Observe that the right hand side of the equality
decreases in η and that
(26)
∂X (η)
∂η
= X ′(η) = −X (η)[η + X (η)].
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This slope is equal to zero if and only if X (η) = −η. Hence, whenever X (η) = −η, the
right hand side of the equality strictly decreases in η, while its left hand side remains
constant. As the slope of X (η) varies smoothly with changes in η, this implies that there
is exactly one ηˆ < 0 such that X (ηˆ) = −ηˆ.
Note that if η < ηˆ, X (η) < −η, and X ′(η) > 0. Similarly, if η > ηˆ, X ′(η) < 0. As the
denominator of 25 is greater than 1− δ and as limη→+∞ f(η) = limη→−∞ f(η) = 0, one
has: limη→−∞X (η) = limη→+∞X (η) = 0.
On the basis of 26, one has
lim
η→∞
X ′(η) = lim
η→∞
X (η)(−η)− lim
η→∞
[X (η)]2.
Since limη→∞X (η) = 0, limη→∞[X (η)]
2 = 0. Observe also that
X (η)(−η) =
δf(η)(−η)
1− δ(1− F (η))
=
δf ′(η)
1− δ(1− F (η))
.
As limη→∞ f
′(η) = 0 and as δ < 1, limη→∞X (η)(−η) = 0. Hence, limη→∞X
′(η) = 0.
By the same reasoning, limη→−∞X
′(η) is zero.
Observe that
(27) X ′′(η) = −ηX ′(η)− 2X ′(η)X (η)−X (η).
As limη→−∞X (η) = limη→−∞X
′(η) = 0,
lim
η→−∞
X ′′(η) = lim
η→−∞
−ηX ′(η) ≥ 0,
and for η sufficiently small X ′′(η) > 0. As X ′(ηˆ) = 0, it follows from 27 that X ′′(ηˆ) < 0.
By continuity, there exists at least one ηm ∈ (−∞, ηˆ) such that X ′′(ηm) = 0. Differenti-
ating 27, and evaluating at the point η = ηm, one has
X ′′′(η)
∣∣
η=ηm
= −X ′(ηm)− 2
(
X ′(ηm)
)2
< 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that X ′(ηm) > 0, as ηm < ηˆ. We conclude
that ηm is unique.
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Recall that ηˆ < 0. Suppose limδ→1X
′(ηˆ) = 0 for some ηˆ ∈ (−∞, 0). It follows from
26 that
lim
δ→1
X ′(ηˆ) = 0 ⇔ −ηˆ = lim
δ→1
X (ηˆ) =
f(ηˆ)
F (ηˆ)
= r(ηˆ).
It is easy to check that ∂r(η)
∂η
= −r(η)(r(η) + η). Hence, r′(ηˆ) = 0. This, however,
contradicts the fact that ∀η ∈ (−∞,∞), r′(η) < 0 (see Greene, 1993, Theorem 22.2).
Thus, limδ→1 ηˆ = −∞.
Observe that limδ→0X (η) = 0 ∀η. Hence, limδ→0X
′(ηm) = 0.
As ηm < ηˆ and limδ→1 ηˆ = −∞, limδ→1 η
m = −∞. Therefore, limδ→1X (η
m) =
f(−∞)
F (−∞) = ∞, where the last equality follows from l’Hoˆpital’s rule. It follows from 27 that
(28) X ′′(ηm) = 0 ⇔ ηm = −X (ηm)
(
1
X ′(ηm)
+ 2
)
.
Recall that X ′(ηm) = −X (ηm)[ηm + X (ηm)]. Replacing ηm on the right-hand side of
this equality by the right-hand side of the last equality in 28, and rearranging, one has
(29)
[X ′(ηm)]2
1 + X ′(ηm)
= [X (ηm)]2.
As limδ→1X (η
m) = ∞, limδ→1[X (η
m)]2 = ∞. Thus limδ→1
[X ′(ηm)]2
1+X ′(ηm) = ∞, which implies
that limδ→1X
′(ηm) = ∞.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1. Call LHS (RHS) the left-hand side
(respectively right-hand side) of equation 5 after replacing µ∗ by µ, and observe that
∂LHS
∂µ
= 1 and that
∂RHS
∂µ
= κ1κ2X
′(κ1(µ− Θ¯)) =
1− α
1 + α
X ′(κ1(µ− Θ¯)),
where the last equality follows from the fact that β2α =
1
1+α . From Lemma 5 we know that
X ′(κ1(µ
∗−Θ¯)) is maximal when κ1(µ
∗−Θ¯) = ηm.24 As X ′′(·) > 0 when κ1(µ
∗−Θ¯) < ηm,
as X ′′(·) < 0 when κ1(µ
∗− Θ¯) ∈ (ηm, ηˆ) and as X ′(·) < 0 when κ1(µ
∗− Θ¯) > ηˆ, it follows
that ∀Θ¯, there exists a unique equilibrium in symmetric switching strategies if and only
if
∂RHS
∂µ
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗= η
m
κ1
+Θ¯
≤
∂LHS
∂µ
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗= η
m
κ1
+Θ¯
⇔ X ′(ηm) ≤
1 + α
1− α
.
24As a unit increase in Θ¯ leads to a translation of X (·) to the right by one unit (as shown in Figure
1), it follows that there exists a unique Θ¯ such that κ1(µ
∗ − Θ¯) = ηm.
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We know from Lemma 5 that limηm→∞X
′(ηm) = limηm→−∞X
′(ηm) = 0. More-
over, mere observation of 25 also reveals that X (ηm) < ∞ if δ < 1. Hence, X ′(ηm) =
−X (ηm)(ηm +X (ηm)) is finite whenever δ < 1. Observe that limσ2Θ→∞
α = limσ2ǫ→0 α =
1, which, combined with our finding thatX ′(ηm) is finite, implies that limσ2Θ→∞
1−α
1+αX
′(ηm)
= limσ2ǫ→0
1−α
1+αX
′(ηm) = 0. By continuity, there exists a (σ2Θ)
c < ∞ ((σ2ǫ )
c > 0) such
that ∀σ2Θ > (σ
2
Θ)
c (∀σ2ǫ < (σ
2
ǫ )
c), 1−α1+αX
′(ηm) ≤ 1. This establishes claims (1) and (2) of
the proposition.
Since X (ηm) = 0 when δ = 0, one has 1−α1+αX
′(ηm)
∣∣∣
δ=0
= 0. By continuity, there
exists a δc ∈ (0, 1] such that ∀δ ≤ δc, 1−α1+αX
′(ηm) ≤ 1. This establishes claim (3) of the
proposition.
Recall that
(30) g(µ) = µ− τ − κ2X (κ1(µ− Θ¯)),
and observe that equilibrium condition 5 is equivalent to g(µ∗) = 0. If µ < τ , g(µ) < 0.
Thus, µ∗ > τ . Hence, if Θ¯ ≤ τ , κ1(µ
∗ − Θ¯) > 0, ∀τ . It then follows from Lemma 5 that
X ′(κ1(µ
∗ − Θ¯)) < 0. This establishes claim (4) of the proposition.
Suppose that if player i waits, she perfectly learns the state of the world, which
gives an upper bound on the value of learning. Player i’s gain of waiting then equals
δ Pr(Θ > τ |µi)E(Θ|µi,Θ > τ). Observe that for high enough a µi, E(Θ|µi,Θ > τ) ≈
E(Θ|µi) = µi. As δ < 1, there exists a µ¯ <∞ such that µ¯ = δ Pr(Θ > τ |µ¯)E(Θ|µ¯,Θ > τ).
If µ > µ¯ player i strictly prefers to invest at time one. Hence, µ∗ < µ¯ < ∞. As
µ∗ ∈ (τ, µ¯), κ1(µ
∗ − Θ¯) → −∞, as Θ¯ → ∞. It then follows from Lemma 5 that
limΘ¯→∞
1−α
1+αX
′(κ1(µ
∗ − Θ¯)) = 0. By continuity, there exists a Θ¯u such that if Θ¯ ≥ Θ¯u,
1−α
1+αX
′(κ1(µ
∗ − Θ¯)) ≤ 1. This establishes claim (5) of the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 2.
W (τ) denotes welfare when the investment tax equals τ . Note that W (0) is bounded
below by ∫ ∞
0
µif
(
µi − Θ¯
σµi
)
dµi ≡W (0).
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Intuitively, W (0) represents welfare when τ = 0 and when players cannot engage in
social learning (i.e. when players invest if their posterior mean exceed zero). Observe
also that W (τ) is bounded above by the welfare that prevails when players observe the
state of the world prior to the first investment date. In that case, welfare equals∫ ∞
τ
Θf
(
Θ− Θ¯
σΘ
)
dΘ ≡W (τ),
which is decreasing in τ when τ > 0. As W (0) > W (0) > W (∞) = 0, by continuity
there exists a unique τ¯ > 0 such that W (τ¯) = W (0). As W (τ¯) < W (τ¯) = W (0) < W (0),
this implies that ∀τ ≥ τ¯ , a social planner can increase welfare by setting the investment
tax to zero.
Furthermore, as
Θ¯ =
∫ ∞
−∞
µif
(
µi − Θ¯
σµi
)
dµi < W (0),
by an identical argument as above there exists a unique τ < 0 such that
∫∞
τ
Θf
(
Θ−Θ¯
σΘ
)
dΘ =
W (0). ∀τ ≤ τ , a social planner can increase welfare by setting the investment tax to
zero.
Proof of Proposition 2.
We first state and prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 6. For any first-period cutoff µ∗, there exists a unique-second period cutoff µ.
Proof: Recall that
(31) φ(µ) = µ− τ + κ2h (x(µ
∗, µ)) .
At the second-period cutoff E(Θ|µ, µj > µ
∗) = τ , which is equivalent to φ(µ) = 0.
Differentiating and using that σo = ασ2 and that βσ2 = 2κ2, shows that
∂φ(µ)
∂µ
= 1−
β
2
h′ (x(µ∗, µ)) > 0
since h′ ∈ (0, 1) (see Theorem 22.2 (Greene, 1993)) and β < 1. Hence, if there exists a
solution, it is unique. We are left to establish that a solution exists. First, observe that
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limµ→∞ φ(µ) > 0. Second, note that
lim
µ→−∞
[µ− τ + κ2h (x(µ
∗, µ))] < 0,
is equivalent to
lim
µ→−∞
[
µ− τ + κ2h (x(µ
∗, µ))
µ
]
> 0,
which by l’Hoˆpital’s rule is equivalent to
lim
µ→−∞
[
1−
β
2
h′ (x(µ∗, µ))
]
> 0.
Since h′ ∈ (0, 1) and β < 1 this holds, which establishes the existence of µ.
Lemma 7. Suppose the symmetric switching equilibrium is unique. Then dµ
∗
dτ
> 0. Fur-
thermore, there exists Θ¯c1 , Θ¯c2 ∈ R such that
dµ
dτ
> 0 for all Θ¯ /∈ [Θ¯c1 , Θ¯c2 ].
Proof: As stated above, equation 31 implicitly defines µ as φ(µ) = 0. It is important to
realize however that the image of φ also depends on µ∗. A change in τ thus affects φ(·)
directly and indirectly through the induced change in µ∗. It therefore follows from the
implicit function theorem that
(32)
dµ
dτ
=
− ∂φ
∂µ∗
dµ∗
dτ
− ∂φ
∂τ
∂φ
∂µ
.
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation 30, one has
dµ∗
dτ
= −
∂g
∂τ
∂g
∂µ∗
=
1
1− 1−α1+αX
′(κ1(µ∗ − Θ¯))
.
As the symmetric switching equilibrium is unique, the denominator is positive, which
proves the first result stated in the lemma. After taking the appropriate partial deriva-
tives of the φ-function, and taking into account the fact that σo = ασ2 and that
β
2α =
1
1+α ,
one has
(33)
dµ
dτ
=
− 11+αh
′
(
x(µ∗, µ)
)
1
1− 1−α
1+α
X ′(κ1(µ∗−Θ¯))
+ 1
1− 12βh
′
(
x(µ∗, µ)
) .
Observe that the denominator is positive since β < 1 and h′ ∈ (0, 1). Hence
dµ
dτ
> 0 if
1 + α− (1− α)X ′(κ1(µ
∗ − Θ¯)) > h′
(
x(µ∗, µ)
)
.
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Since µ∗ ∈ (τ, µ¯) and both τ and Θ¯ are finite, Lemma 5 implies that limΘ¯→−∞ X
′(κ1(µ
∗−
Θ¯)) = limΘ¯→∞X
′(κ1(µ
∗−Θ¯)) = 0. Since h′ < 1 the above inequality is therefore satisfied
in both limit cases and the second statement of the lemma follows from the fact that µ
is continuous in Θ¯.
Recall that µ˜ = (1− α)Θ¯− µ∗ and that x(µ∗, µi) =
µ∗−αµi−(1−α)Θ¯
σo
.
Lemma 8. For any τ > 0, there exists a Θ¯c3(τ) such that µ˜ < µ for all ∀Θ¯ ≤ Θ¯c3(τ).
Proof: Rewriting x(µ∗, µ˜) using κ2 =
1
2βσ2 and
β
2α =
1
1+α verifies that µ˜ = −κ2x(µ
∗, µ˜).
Furthermore, using the definition of φ in equation 31 and that µ is implicitly defined
through φ(µ) = 0, one has µ = τ − κ2h(x(µ
∗, µ)). Therefore,
(34) µ− µ˜ = τ − κ2
(
h(x(µ∗, µ))− x(µ∗, µ˜)
)
.
Furthermore,
(35) x(µ∗, µ˜) = x(µ∗, µ) +
µ− µ˜
σ2
.
Inserting 35 into 34, and rearranging, yields
(µ− µ˜)
(
1−
1
2
β
)
= τ − κ2
(
h(x(µ∗, µ))− x(µ∗, µ)
)
.
Recall that h′(η) = h(η)[h(η) − η], that h′(η) ∈ (0, 1), and that limη→∞ h(η) = ∞.
Hence, h(η) > η and limη→∞(h(η)− η) = 0. Since µ < τ , limΘ¯→−∞ x(µ
∗, µ) = ∞, which
implies that
lim
Θ¯→−∞
−κ2
(
h(x(µ∗, µ))− x(µ∗, µ)
)
= 0.
As 1− 12β > 0, this implies that limΘ¯→−∞(µ− µ˜) = τ/
(
1− 12β
)
> 0. The lemma then
follows from the fact that both µ and µ˜ are continuous in Θ¯.
We are now ready to prove the first statement of the proposition. Using σo = ασ2,
equation 3, and Lemma 4, one has
∂
∂µ∗
[Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi)E(Θ|µi, µj > µ
∗)] =
∂
∂µ∗
[(1− F (x(µ∗, µi)))(µi + κ2h(x(µ
∗, µi)))]
= −f(x(µ∗, µi))
1
ασ2
(µi + κ2h(x(µ
∗, µi))) +
β
2α
h′(x(µ∗, µi))(1− F (x(µ
∗, µi))).
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Note that h′(η)(1−F (η)) = f(η)(h(η)−η) and recall that κ2 =
1
2βσ2 and that 1−
β
2 =
β
2α .
Hence,
(36)
∂
∂µ∗
[Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi)E(Θ|µi, µj > µ
∗)] = −f(x(µ∗, µi))
β
2α2σ2
(
µi + µ
∗ − (1− α)Θ¯
)
,
which implies that
(37)
∫ µ∗
µ
∂
∂µ∗
[Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi)E(Θ|µi, µj > µ
∗)] f
(
µi − Θ¯
σµ
)
> 0,
if (1−α)Θ¯−µ∗−µi > 0 for all µi ∈ [µ, µ
∗], which in turn holds if Θ¯ > 21−αµ
∗. It follows
from the proof of Proposition 1 that limΘ¯→∞ µ
∗ = τ < ∞. As µ∗ is continuous in Θ¯,
for sufficiently high Θ¯, 37 holds. Since by Lemma 7 µ∗ and µ are increasing in τ for
sufficiently high Θ¯, inequality 37 implies that equation 7 is positive, i.e. that dW
dτ
> 0 for
all τ ≤ 0. Hence for sufficiently high Θ¯ it is optimal to tax investment.
We now prove the second statement of the proposition. Fix τ ′ > 0. Furthermore,
observe that
(38)
∫ µ∗
µ
∂
∂µ∗
[Pr(µj > µ
∗|µi)E(Θ|µi, µj > µ
∗)] f
(
µi − Θ¯
σµ
)
< 0,
if (1 − α)Θ¯ − µ∗ − µi < 0 for all µi ∈ [µ, µ
∗], which in turn holds if µ˜ < µ. Because for
sufficiently low Θ¯ Lemma 8 implies that µ˜ < µ and Lemma 7 implies that both µ∗ and µ
are increasing in τ , inspection of equation 7 shows thatdW
dτ
|τ=τ ′< 0. Hence, any positive
tax level is suboptimal for sufficiently low Θ¯.
Proof of Proposition 3
We first show that there exist values of our exogenous parameters such that equilibrium
is unique and such that either
dµ
dτ
< 0 or
dµ
dτ
> 0 (Step 1). Next, we show that if δ is
close to one or if δ = 0, dµ
∗
dτ
≤ 1 (Step 2). Finally, we prove that the second step implies
that
dµ
dτ
> 0 (Step 3).
Step 1: It follows from 33 that
dµ
dτ
< 0 and that equilibrium is unique if and only if
(39) 0 ≤ 1 + α− (1− α)X ′(κ1(µ
∗ − Θ¯)) < h′
(
x(µ∗, µ)
)
.
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(The first inequality ensures uniqueness while the second one ensures that
dµ
dτ
< 0.) From
Lemma 5 we know that limδ→0X
′(·) = 0. As h′(·) < 1, this implies that the second
inequality is not satisfied when δ is sufficiently low. Furthermore, Lemma 7 proves that
the second inequality is also not satisfied when Θ¯ is either greater than Θ¯c1 or lower than
Θ¯c2 . From Lemma 5 we also know that limδ→1X
′(ηm) = ∞. As X ′(·) is continuous in
(Θ¯, δ), and as limδ→0X
′(·) = 0, there exists a (Θ¯′, δ′) such that X ′(κ1(µ
∗ − Θ¯)) = 1+α1−α .
As h′(·) > 0, it then follows that inequality 39 is respected whenever (Θ¯, δ) = (Θ¯′, δ′).
As h′(·) is also continuous in (Θ¯, δ), there exist values of (Θ¯, δ) close to (Θ¯′, δ′), which
ensure that the two inequalities of 39 are satisfied.
Step 2: In the body of the text, we explained why dµ
∗
dτ
∣∣∣
δ=0
= 1. We now show that
limδ→1
dµ∗
dτ
< 1. It follows from equation 21 that
(40) lim
δ→1
E(Θ|µ∗, µj < µ
∗
j ) = τ.
Inserting 19 into E(Θ|s1, s2 < s
c
2) =
β
2 s1 + (1 − β)Θ¯ +
β
2E(s2|s1, s2 < s
c
2), taking into
account that β(1 + α) = 2α, and rearranging, one has
(41) E(Θ|µ1, µ2 < µ
c
2) = µ1 − κ2r (x(µ
c
2, µ1)) .
It then follows from 40 and 41 that, for δ close to one,
µ∗ − κ2r(κ1(µ
∗ − Θ¯)) = τ.
Call LHS, the left-hand side of the above equality after replacing µ∗ by µ. One has
∂LHS
∂µ
= 1 − κ1κ2r
′(·) > 1 as r′(·) < 0. This implies that if the right-hand side of the
equality above increases by dτ , the above equality is satisfied only if µ∗ increases by less
than dτ .
Step 3: Consider equation 32. As ∂φ
∂µ∗
> 0, it follows from Step 2 that if δ = 0 or if
δ → 1,
dµ
dτ
is bounded below by
− ∂φ
∂µ∗
− ∂φ
∂τ
∂φ
∂µ
. As argued below 33, the denominator of this
lower bound is positive. Hence,
dµ
dτ
> 0, if the numerator is. Taking the appropriate
derivatives of our φ-function, one has
−
∂φ
∂µ∗
−
∂φ
∂τ
> 0 ⇔ 1 + α > h′
(
x(µ∗, µ)
)
,
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which is satisfied as h′(·) < 1. As dµ
∗
dτ
is continuous in δ, it then follows from equation
32 that
dµ
dτ
remains strictly positive for δ sufficiently close to one or δ sufficiently close
to zero.
Proof of Proposition 4
We first show that µcj − αµ
I
i (µ
c
j) is increasing in µ
c
j (Step 1). Next, we show that this
property implies that µIi initially increases in µ
c
j and then decreases (Step 2). Finally,
in Step 3, we prove that
dµIi
dµcj
∣∣∣
µi=µcj=µ
∗
> 0 ⇔ ∂X (κ1(µ−Θ¯))
∂µ
∣∣∣
µi=µcj=µ
∗
> 0. Those three
steps, together with the explanations provided in the text, prove the first sentence of the
proposition. The third step, combined with (i) the fact that X is initially increasing,
(ii) that an increase in Θ¯ shifts X to the right (as illustrated in Figure 1), and (iii) that
the optimal tax rate is finite (as stated in Lemma 2), implies the second sentence of the
proposition.
Step 1: Observe that d
dµcj
[µcj −αµ
I
i (µ
c
j)] > 0 ⇔
dµIi
dµcj
< 1
α
. Furthermore, Lemma 4 and the
explanations following 12 allow us to conclude that
∆(µIi , µ
c
j) = µ
I
i − τ − δ[1− F (x(µ
c
j , µ
I
i ))]
[
µIi + κ2h(x(µ
c
j , µ
I
i ))− τ
]
.
Recall that x(µcj , µ
I
i ) =
µcj−αµ
I
i−(1−α)Θ¯
σo
. Define
γ(µIi , µ
c
j) ≡ µ
I
i − τ − κ2X (x(µ
c
j , µ
I
i )) =
∆(µIi , µ
c
j)
1− δ(1− F (x(µcj , µ
I
i )))
.
By definition of µIi , ∆(µ
I
i , µ
c
j) = 0 and hence γ(µ
I
i , µ
c
j) = 0. Thus, the implicit function
theorem implies
(42)
dµIi
dµcj
= −
∂γ
∂µcj
∂γ
∂µIi
=
κ2
1
σo
X ′(x(µcj , µ
I
i ))
1 + κ2
α
σo
X ′(x(µcj , µ
I
i ))
<
1
α
.
Step 2: It follows from Lemma 1 that ∂γ
∂µi
∣∣∣
µi=µIi
> 0. The equalities presented in 42 then
allow us to conclude that
dµIi
dµcj
> 0 ⇔
∂γ
∂µcj
∣∣∣∣∣
µi=µIi
< 0 ⇔ −
1
σo
κ2X
′(x(µcj , µ
I
i )) < 0 ⇔ X
′(x(µcj , µ
I
i )) > 0.
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From Step 1 we know that x is increasing in µcj . It then follows from Lemma 5 that µ
I
i
initially increases and then decreases in µcj .
Step 3: It follows from 42 and from Step 2 that
dµIi
dµcj
∣∣∣∣∣
µi=µcj=µ
∗
> 0 ⇔
∂X (x(µcj , µ
I
i ))
∂x(µcj , µ
I
i )
∣∣∣∣∣
µi=µcj=µ
∗
> 0 ⇔
∂X (κ1(µ− Θ¯))
∂µ
∣∣∣∣
µi=µcj=µ
∗
> 0,
where the last equivalence follows from the fact that κ1 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
We first state and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Suppose all players invest at time one if and only if their posterior is greater
than µc. Then, F (n|µ) is increasing in µ in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.
Proof: Suppose µ′ > µ. Define q ≡ Pr(µj ≥ µ
c|µ) and q′ ≡ Pr(µj ≥ µ
c|µ′). As µ′ > µ,
q′ > q. Observe that
Pr(n|µ) = CnN−1q
n(1− q)N−1−n,
Pr(n|µ′) = CnN−1(q
′)n(1− (q′))N−1−n.
Observe also that Pr(0|µ) = (1 − q)N−1 > (1 − q′)N−1 = Pr(0|µ′). We now show that
∃ a ∈ N+ such that ∀n < a, Pr(n|µ) ≥ Pr(n|µ′) and ∀n ≥ a, Pr(n|µ) < Pr(n|µ′).
Suppose this were not true. As Pr(0|µ) > Pr(0|µ′), it follows then that ∃ q, q′ and
nonnegative integers z > y > x such that
(43) qz(1− q)N−1−z > (q′)z(1− (q′))N−1−z,
(44) qy(1− q)N−1−y < (q′)y(1− (q′))N−1−y,
(45) qx(1− q)N−1−x > (q′)x(1− (q′))N−1−x.
Taking logarithms, subtracting equation 44 from equation 43, and rewriting gives
log q − log q′ > log(1− q)− log(1− q′).
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Taking logarithms, subtracting equation 44 from equation 45, and rewriting gives
log q − log q′ < log(1− q)− log(1− q′),
a contradiction. Hence, Pr(n|µ) and Pr(n|µ′) possess the single crossing property. As is
well known, this proves the Lemma.
As E(Θ|µi, n) is increasing in n, we can rewrite 10 as
∆(µi, µ
c) = (1− δ)
∑
n≥nc
Pr(n|µi)
(
E(Θ|µi, n)− τ
)
+
∑
n<nc
Pr(n|µi)
(
E(Θ|µi, n)− τ
)
,
where nc is defined as the lowest integer such that E(Θ|µi, n) ≥ τ . If E(Θ|µi, 0) ≥
τ , ∆(µi, µ
c) = µi − τ , which is strictly increasing in µi. A similar remark applies
when E(Θ|µi, N − 1) < τ . Thus, suppose that 0 < nc ≤ N − 1. From Lemma 9 we
know that an increase in µi puts more weight on higher realizations of n (and, thus, on
higher values of E(Θ|µ, n)). This observation, combined with the fact that E(Θ|µi, n)
is strictly increasing in µi, proves that ∆(µi, µ
c), is strictly increasing in µi. Hence,
any symmetric candidate equilibrium cutoff µ∗ for which ∆(µ∗, µ∗) = 0 gives rise to a
symmetric switching equilibrium. We have established in the text that there is a unique
such candidate equilibrium, which completes the proof of Proposition 5.
References
Angeletos, G.-M., and Pavan, A., “Policy with Dispersed Information”, Journal of
the European Economic Association, March 2009, 7(1), 11-60
Avery, C., and Zemsky, P., “Multi-dimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in
Financial Markets”, American Economic Review, 1998, 88, 724-748
Banerjee, A., “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
57 (1992), 797-817.
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. and Welch, I., “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Cus-
tom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades”, Journal of Political Economy,
42
100 (1992), 992-1026.
Caplin, A., and Leahy, J., “Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and
Search ”, The Economic Journal, 1998, 108(1), 60-74
Chamley, C., “Delays and Equilibria with Large and Small Information in Social Learn-
ing”, European Economic Review, 48 (2004a), 477-501
Chamley, C., “Rational Herds, Economic Models of Social Learning”, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2004b, 402p.
Chamley, C., and Gale, D., “Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model
of Investment”, Econometrica, 1994, 62(5), 1065-1085
Choi, J.P., “Herd Behavior, the “Penguin” Effect and the Suppression of Informational
Diffusion: An Analysis of Informational Externalities and Payoff Interdependencies”,
Rand Journal of Economics, 1997, 28(3), 407-425
Dasgupta, A., “Coordination and Delay in Global Games”, Journal of Economic The-
ory, May 2007, 134, 195-225
DeGroot, M. H., “Optimal Statistical Decisions”, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1970,
489p.
Eyster, E., and Rabin, M., ”Naive Herding”, Mimeo, 2008, 49p.
Frisell, L., “On the Interplay of Informational Spillovers and Payoff Externalities”,
Rand Journal of Economics, 2003, 34(3), 582-592
Gossner, O., and Melissas, N., “Informational Cascades Elicit Private Information”,
International Economic Review, 2006, 47(1), 297-325
Greene, W. H., “Econometric Analysis”, Second Edition, Macmillan, 1993
Greenspan, A., “The Age of Turbulence, Adventures in a New World”, Penguin Books,
2008, 563p.
Gul, F., and Lundholm, R., “Timing and the Clustering of Agents’ Decisions”, Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 1995, 103(5), 1039-1066
Gunay, H., “The Role of Externalities and Information Aggregation in Market Col-
lapse”, Economic Theory, 2008, 35(2), 367-379
Hendricks, K., and Kovenock, D., “Asymmetric Information, Information External-
43
ities, and Efficiency: The Case of Oil Exploration”, Rand Journal of Economics, 1989,
20(2), 164-182
Johnson, N. L., Kotz, S., and Balakrishnan, N., “Continuous Univariate Distri-
butions,” John Wiley and Sons, 1995
Levin, D. and Peck, J. “Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values”,
Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 143, 114-139
Vives, X., “Learning from Others: A Welfare Analysis”, Games and Economic Behav-
ior, 1997, 20, 177-200
Zhang, J., “Strategic Delay and the Onset of Investment Cascades”, Rand Journal of
Economics, 1997, 28(1), 188-205
44
